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South Africa has a history of human rights atrocities that have created an urgency to 
attend to the previously marginalised and vulnerable groups of society. The 
Constitution of the state as well as other international treaties have created 
provisions that entrench the commitment to protect the child. This has been done 
through the inclusion of the ‘best interests of the child’ principle in the instruments. 
This study examines the development of the ‘best interests of the child’ principle. 
Furthermore, it analyses how and why the principle developed in the international 
and national context. The purpose is to come to the conclusion that the newly 
introduced Children’s Act has created a better scope of protection than the previous 
common law precedent. 
The focus of the study is a critique of the method of application of the ‘best interests 
of the child’ principle in South Africa. The author will specifically focus on section 
7 of the Children’s Act and prove why the courts should be applying this provision 
in child-related cases.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Over the years the rate of divorce has increased and has continued to impact on the 
lives of families. Various decisions must be made concerning new arrangements 
during and after the finalisation of divorce. This is a difficult and unpleasant 
experience, particularly when children are involved. The courts are then tasked to 
decide what the ‘best interests of the child’ are pending the finalisation of the 
divorce. 
This thesis examines the application of section 7 of the Children’s Act1 by 
South African High Courts when deciding child-related matters in divorce cases. 
Section 7 of the Children’s Act offers the court a list of factors (hereafter the section 
7 list) which it may consider (if relevant) when deciding important child-related 
questions in the context of the post-divorce family, for example: with which parent 
will the child live? How will contact with the other parent be maintained? Which of 
the parents will be the primary decision-maker in day-to-day matters concerning the 
child? In the old-fashioned language of the Divorce Act,2 such matters were referred 
to as ‘custody’3 and ‘access’.4 The Children’s Act uses the terms ‘care’ and ‘contact’ 
instead. 
Both section 28(2) of the Constitution and section 9 of the Children’s Act 
provide a clear principle: ‘A child’s best interests are of paramount importance in 
every matter concerning the child.’5 The section 7 list gives the courts guidance as to 
how to determine the ‘best interests’ of the child.  
                                                          
1 Act 38 of 2005. S 7 is also used outside the court in child-related proceedings, but for purposes of 
this paper, reference will be made to the court’s use of the list of factors in s 7. 
2 Act 70 of 1979. 
3 T Boezaart Child Law in South Africa (2009) 65. The definition of ‘care’ provided in the Act is 
much broader than the traditional understanding of ‘custody’ provided by RW Lee, T Honoré  HJ 
Erasmus, CG Van Der Merwe and AH Van Wyk Family, Things and Succession 131 (1983). The 
authors defined child custody in terms of common law as follows: a parent is ‘entitled to the physical 
presence of the child and controls his daily life and education (both secular and religious); decisions 
on medical care for the child, the necessary reasonable discipline and the persons with whom the 
child may associate are also made by the custodian parent.’ See also Governing Body, Gene Louw 
Primary School v Roodtman 2004 (1) SA 45 (C) paras 51-52; Wheeler v Wheeler [2011] 2 All SA 
459 (KZP) 465 paras 26-28. 
4 The Children’s Act uses the word ‘contact’ instead of ‘access’ which was traditionally used in 
common law. Contact is primarily about maintaining a relationship between a parent and a child 
when they no longer share a home. See s 1(1) of the Children’s Act. 




These new legislated factors were deliberately drafted in response to South 
Africa’s constitutional obligations towards the child6 and in response to the state’s 
international obligations in terms of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child7 (hereafter CRC) and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child8 (hereafter the ACRWC).  All three of these human rights documents require 
decision-makers to prioritise and protect the child’s best interests. In addition, all 
three documents provide important protection for children’s human rights. 
The above international treaties did not introduce the ‘best interests’ 
principle into South African law. On the contrary, divorce courts have used the 
principle for a long time.9 There is a large body of common law precedent on 
interpretation of the principle in the context of ‘custody’ and ‘access’.10  
The question then shifts to why the South African Law Reform Commission 
(hereafter SALRC) decided to legislate a list of factors in the new Children’s Act. 
Why did it decide that the old common law precedent was inadequate and required 
improvement? It appears that some of the reasons were: 
1. The common law precedent often failed to meet the demands of the new 
Constitution. For example, the children’s right to human dignity,11 equality12 
and the right to be in an environment that is not harmful.13 Thus it would be 
useful to offer courts a fresh start with a list of constitutionally-compliant 
factors.  
2. The common law precedent was insufficiently ‘human-rights-based’ and was 
not firmly grounded on children’s rights. Thus it failed to meet the 
requirements of the Constitution, and also failed to meet the requirements of 
the international treaties.  
3. The ‘best interests’ standard is inherently flexible and thus, also, inherently 
indeterminate.  It is necessary to find a ‘sweet spot’ which allows for enough 
                                                          
6 As laid out in s 28 of the Constitution. 
7 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989 
available at http://www.unicef.org.uk/Documents/Publication-pdfs/UNCRC_PRESS200910web.pdf 
accessed 7 September 2015. 
8 Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 11 
July 1990, CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990) available  
at http://www.unicef.org/esaro/African_Charter_articles_in_full.pdf accessed 7 September 2015. 
9 See Simey v Simey 1881 (1) SC 171; Kramarski v Kramaski 1906 TS 937; Tabb v Tabb 1909 TS 
1033. 
10 To be discussed in detail in Chapter Two.  
11 S 10 of the Constitution.  
12 S 9 of the Constitution.  




flexibility for the uniqueness of every child and every family, while also 
reigning-in excessively arbitrary decision-making. The common law 
precedent did not offer enough guidance. The section 7 list was intended to 
offer far clearer guidelines and to ensure that child-related decisions were 
based on a constitutional and rights-based list of factors. The section 7 
factors allow for flexibility while also restricting the ambit of an individual 
judge’s decisions. 
4. The common law precedent was inconsistent. This led to uncertainty. It 
encouraged litigation; it prolonged litigation. Excessive or prolonged 
litigation is not good for children (or their parents). Excessive litigation is, in 
itself, not in the child’s best interests. Excessive litigation also clogs up the 
legal system. This is not in the interests of justice. 
5. And, lastly, it was difficult to clearly define the legal position of children’s 
rights. This was because there was an overlap between common law and 
statute law.14 Therefore, a clear statutory list would guide courts when 
defining a legal position in child-related cases. 
The section 7 list was designed to deal with these problems. The SALRC believed 
that if divorce courts based their child-related judgments on the section list 7 rather 
than on common law precedent, the decisions would best serve the ‘best interests of 
the child’ standard. The section 7 list would ensure that the decisions were 
constitutionally-compliant, would uphold and promote children’s rights, and would 
ensure justice for children. 
Section 7 of the Children’s Act came into operation almost ten years ago on 
1 July 2007.15 Considering the numbers of years the provision has been operating in 
South Africa, the reaction by the divorce courts has been disappointing. In the 
majority of divorce cases, the courts have ignored the section 7 list when deciding 
child-related matters.  
An empirical analysis by this author revealed that during the last five years 
(2010 to 2015) the courts used the section 7 list in only 31 percent of cases 
concerned with care and contact.16  Instead, the courts have relied on old common 
                                                          
14 South African Law Commission Issue Paper 13 (Project 110) ‘The Review of the Child Care Act 
First Issue Paper’ (1998) para 6.2. 
15 S 7 of the Children’s Act. 




law precedent—the same common law that was criticised for relying on values that 
do not sufficiently protect children. 
The reaction of the courts has been disappointing because the section 7 list 
was intended to help establish the best outcome for the child. It was intended to 
ensure that child-related decisions would be human-rights based and constitutionally 
compliant. It was intended to offer clear guidance which would help to make the 
‘best interests’ standard more predictable and less indeterminate. Evidently, it would 
be of greater use to rely on a list that affords more protection to children. 
The author discusses the drafting history of Section 7 in detail in Chapter 
Three of this paper. However, it is essential to remember that when drafting section 
7, the SALRC was not operating in a legal, theoretical, jurisprudential or historical 
vacuum.  Indeed, it was operating in a particularly rich legal, jurisprudential and 
historical environment. If there is to be an understanding of the drafting history and 
objectives of section 7 of the Children’s Act, it is essential to explore the legal and 
historical context in which the section was drafted.  
Chapter Two explores this rich context. It examines the theoretical and 
historical development of the ‘best interests of the child’ principle. It examines the 
ways in which the principle has become incorporated into important human rights 
documents, with the result that the principle may now be understood as 
fundamentally human-rights-based. This Chapter also explores the history of the 
principle in the context of South African common law. In this context, 
jurisprudential development of the principle was not human-rights-based.  Indeed, 
some of the decisions would have been inconsistent with the Constitution had they 
been heard in the constitutional era. 
I. Chapters Layout 
The first part of Chapter Two examines the international context of the ‘best 
interests’ principle. It examines the history of the rights of the child and explains 
how the ‘best interests’ principle has evolved, as well as the various instruments that 
have been adopted internationally.  
The next part of Chapter Two discusses the South African context and gives 
an analysis of how the Constitutional Court has interpreted the ‘best interests’ 
principle. This section has a particular focus on the meaning of ‘paramount 




Population Development v Fitzpatrick17, De Reuck v Director of Public 
Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local Division)18 and S v M (Centre for Child Law as 
Amicus Curiae)19 (hereafter S v M). 
These cases were selected for two reasons: first, these cases have contributed to a 
better understanding of the ‘best interests of the child’ principle in their different 
circumstances. Secondly, the various interpretations by the Constitutional Court are 
used in the application of the section 7 list. This part of the chapter also examines 
the ‘best interests of the child’ principle as developed by the high courts in the pre-
Constitutional era. 
Chapter Three is very important because it lays the foundation for the 
primary argument of this thesis by examining the work that was invested in 
compiling the Children’s Act. The author explains how the SALRC worked on the 
‘best interests’ principle. Furthermore, the paper will highlight the importance of 
using the Children’s Act as opposed to the referring back to common law. 
Chapter four examines how South African divorce courts have used the ‘best 
interests’ standard. The author argues that the courts have failed to use the principle 
as set out in the Children’s Act, and explains why this is problematic. The firth 
Chapter will be the concluding remarks and recommendations to remedy the current 
situation. 
                                                          
17 2000 (3) SA 422 (CC). 
18 2004 SA 406 (CC). 




CHAPTER II THE CONTEXT IN WHICH SECTION 7 WAS DRAFTED. 
2.1 Introduction 
Many courts have pronounced that the ‘best interests of the child’ principle forms an 
integral part of children’s law.20 Determining the ‘best interests of the child’ entails 
considering the interests of the child prior to making decisions which affect the life 
of the child.21 In South Africa, this standard was initially applied only in custody 
cases, but has since extended to being applied in all matters where children’s rights 
are deliberated.22   
The ‘best interests of the child’ standard has been incorporated into many 
Constitutions. For example, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa23, the 
Constitution of the Republic of Namibia24 and the Constitution of the Republic of 
Uganda25 have all included the standard.26 The standard is also included in various 
child and family law statutes27, for example section 4 of the Ugandan Children’s 
Act28, section 2 of the Ghanaian Children’s Act29 and the English Family Law Act 
199630 to name a few. The inclusion of the principle in the different statutes is 
evidence of the common understanding by the different states that the principle 
helps in protecting children. 
However, the best interests of the child principle has been criticised for 
creating difficulties in its application. It is deemed to be too ‘vague, indeterminate or 
overly susceptible to biased interpretation by decision-makers’31, and this has 
                                                          
20 Kaiser v Chambers 1969 (4) SA 224 (C); Bethell v Bland 1996 (2) SA 194 (W) at 208; Nel v 
Byliefeldt 2015 ZAGPPHC 386 at 26; Van Pletzen v Van Pletzen 1998 (4) SA 95 (O). 
21 Y Dausab ‘The “best interests” of the child’ (2010) in  Ruppel O (ed) Children’s Rights in Namibia 
(2009) MacMillan, Windhoek 145.  
22 See Metiso v Padongelukfonds 2001 (3) SA 1142 (T); Bannatyne v Bannatyne (Commission for 
Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae) 2003 (2) SA 363 (CC); Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and 
Population Development (Lesbian and Gay Equality Project as Amicus Curiae) 2003 (2) SA 198 
(CC).   
23 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
24 Article 15. 
25 S 34. 
26 A Barratt and S Burman ‘Deciding the best interests of the child: an international perspective on 
custody decision-making’ (2001) 118 SALJ 556 fn 5. 
27 Ibid. 
28 6 of 1996. 
29 560 of 1998.  
30 Barratt and Burman op cit (n26) at fn 11. 
31 See Barratt and Burman op cit (n26) 118; W Domingo and A Barratt ‘Parent and child’ in Barratt 
(ed) Law of Persons and the Family (2012) 181; S Parker ‘The best interests of the child—principles 
and problems’ in P Alson (ed) The Best Interests of The Child: Reconciling Culture and Human 




resulted in great criticism of the various decisions concluded by the courts in the 
application of the principle.32    
In attempts to eradicate the confusion and inconsistency of the standard, the 
SALRC compiled the section 7 list. This new legislated list of factors would assist 
decision-makers decide the ‘best interests of the child’ in child-related cases. As 
stated earlier, the consistency of decisions will result in more predictable outcomes 
for the cases. 
In order to have a holistic understanding of the section 7 list and how it 
adheres to its international obligation to protect children, it is essential unpack how 
this principle developed in the international context.  
 
PART I: THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
2.2 The history of children’s rights 
The first time that children’s rights came to the attention of international law was 
post World War I33 through the 1924 Declaration of Geneva34 (hereafter 1924 
Declaration).35 The 1924 Declaration echoed great concerns relating to the rights of 
children that were infringed as a result of the atrocities of the ‘Great War’ and its 
aftermath.36  Moreover, the era emphasised that the child ‘must have’37 the 
necessary means for a normal growth. Such necessities included food, nursing 
facilities, special care for children with disabilities, and living quarters and support 
for the orphan and waif.38 
However, the 1924 Declaration did not explicitly establish a ‘best interests’ 
standard. The Declaration merely maintained that the child should be of primary 
concern, not only in times of war, but should remain a priority at all times.39  This 
                                                          
32 A more extensive discussion on this is made below in Part II of this chapter. 
33 MDA Freeman The Rights and Wrongs of Children (1983) 19. 
34 T Kaime ‘The foundations of rights in the african charter on the rights and welfare of the child: a 
historical and philosophical account’ (2009) 3 AJLS 121. 
35 C Breen The Standard of the Best Interests of the Child: A Western Tradition in International and 
Comparative Law (2002) 77.  
36 MDA Freeman and P Veerman The Ideologies of Children’s Rights (1992) 4; S Detrick, JE Doek 
and N Cantwell The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Guide to the “Travaux 
Preparatories (1992) 24. 
37 Freeman and Veerman op cit (n36) 4. 
38 Ibid. 





period of international development is important because it initiated the notion of 
making the protection of children a primary concern in all matters. 
Two additional non-binding declarations followed after the 1924 
Declaration, namely the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)40 (hereafter 
UDHR) and the 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child (hereafter 1959 
Declaration), which was introduced by the United Nations General Assembly, and is 
still an effective instrument today.41  
The UDHR was adopted by the United Nations (hereafter UN) on 10 
December 1948, and during that time, the South African government had abstained 
from the voting process of the UDHR.42 The UDHR does not specifically deal with 
children’s rights,43 but the 1959 Declaration evidently gave more clarity on the 
shortcomings of children’s rights in the UDHR.  
The most significant change the 1959 Declaration brought was to shift the 
ideology from the idea of mere child protection, to a new focus on rights for 
children.44 However, this Declaration was not legally binding and therefore merely 
assisted as a guideline. This meant that ‘rights’ for children were only moral 
entitlements.45  
While the instrument was not legally binding, it nevertheless planted a seed 
that children were entitled to protection. Consequently, during the discussion of the 
1959 Declaration, a proposal came forward that the UN should adopt a convention 
on the rights of the child. Following many years of discussions, it was only in 1989 
that the CRC was agreed to by the UN. 
                                                          
40 United Nations General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948 
available. 
 http://www.unicef.org/turkey/pdf/gi17.pdf accessed 7 September 2015. 
41 Detrick, Doek and Cantwell op cit (n36) 24. 
42 See M Olivier ‘The status of  international children’s rights instruments in South Africa’ in CJ 
Davel (ed) Introduction to Child Law in South Africa (2000) 197.  
43 Children were only referred to in Art 25(2) and Art 26, which deal with the right and access to 
education. 
44 J Sloth-Nielsen ‘Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: some 
implications for South African Law’ (1995) 11 SAJHR 402. 





2.3 The Best Interests Principle in International Treaties  
2.3.1 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 
2.3.1.1 Background of the CRC 
The CRC is regarded as the watershed in the history of children.46 It also made 
history by the speed in which states ratified the treaty.47 South Africa became a 
signatory to the CRC on 29 January 1993 and ratified it on 16 June 1995.48 This 
therefore placed an obligation on South Africa to create laws that were in line with 
the object and purpose of the CRC.49  
In the South African context, Buck states that the CRC carries the potential 
to transform the lives of children because it covers a ‘full range of civil, political, 
economic, cultural and social children’s rights.’50 Most importantly, the CRC 
recognises children’s rights as human rights. This means that the understanding and 
concept of the universality of human rights also relates to children’s rights.51  
The reason for the special rights is because ‘the child, by reason of his or her 
physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including 
appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth.’52 On the other hand, the 
CRC did not go without criticism. It was stated that children were adequately 
protected by existing human rights instruments, and therefore an additional treaty 
was unnecessary.53  
In reply to the objections, those advocating for the CRC argued that there 
were specific needs and vulnerabilities of children that were not captured at the time 
that the global instruments were drawn up. Therefore it was necessary to make 
                                                          
46 Freeman and Veerman op cit (n36) 5; Sloth-Nielsen op cit (n44) 401; MDA Freeman ‘Introduction: 
children as persons’ in MDA Freeman (ed) Children’s rights: A comparative perspective (1995) 1. 
47 The CRC took effect on 2 September 1990 and by December 1994 it was ratified by 160 states. See 
Sloth-Nielsen op cit (n44) 403. 
48 JA Robinson The Law of Children and Young Persons (1997) 228. 
49 See United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969 available  
 https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf 
accessed 10 September 2015. Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) 
obliges all States ‘not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its entry into force.’; See 
also J Dugard International Law (1994) 53 ‘there is also a general rule of treaty law that, upon 
ratification, a State Party accepts an obligation to incorporate a treaty's provisions in their national 
law.’ 
50 T Buck International Child Law 3rd ed (2014) 87. 
51 A Lopatka ‘The rights of the child are universal: the perspective of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child’ in MDA Freeman and P Veerman (eds) The Ideologies of Children’s Rights 
(1992) 48. See also Kaime op cit (n34) 126. 
52 Ibid. 





provision for additional needs.54 Even with the above difficulties, the CRC 
overcame those issues and is recognised as the instrument that set the standard for 
the definition of human rights for children.55 
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child56 recognised four articles that 
are the general principles of the CRC. The provisions include article 2 (non-
discrimination), article 3 (best interests), article 6 (survival and development) and 
article 12 (freedom of expression).57 For purposes of this paper, the author will focus 
on article 3− the ‘best interests of the child’. 
2.3.1.2 The ‘best interests of the child’ in terms of the CRC 
Article 3(1) of the CRC states the following;  
‘In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social 
welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, 
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.’58 
 
Accordingly, the above section does not create any rights or duties; it merely serves 
as a principle of interpretation which needs to be considered in all child-related 
matters. It thus has the benefit of functioning as a principle to be considered in 
relation to each of the rights in the CRC and, essentially, in all proceedings 
concerning the child in South Africa.59 This is because South Africa not only ratified 
this instrument, but it also allowed for the inclusion of the protection of children in 
section 28 of the Constitution as well as section 9 of the Children’s Act. 
Furthermore, South Africa went even further than international law by 
creating the section 7 list in order to help decisions-makers reach a decision on 
which circumstances are best for the protection and development of the child. In S v 
M60, Sachs J notes the importance and influence of the CRC in the South African 
domestic law in the following statement: 
‘[16]…section 28 must be seen as responding in an expansive way to our 
international obligations as a State party to the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (the CRC). Section 28 has its origins in the international 
instruments of the United Nations. Thus, since its introduction the CRC has become 
the international standard against which to measure legislation and policies, and has 
                                                          
54 Detrick, Doek and Cantwell (n36) 29. 
55 Olivier op cit (n42) 199. 
56 Monitoring body of the CRC. 
57 G Van Buren ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: An Evolutionary 
Revolution’ in CJ Davel (ed) (Introduction to Child Law in South Africa (2001) 202. 
58 Art 3 (1) of the CRC. 
59 Van Buren op cit (n57) 203. 




established a new structure, modelled on children’s rights, within which to position 
traditional theories on juvenile justice.’61 
 
Evidently the ‘best interests’ is not a new concept. It is a concept that is included in 
influential global conventions. Furthermore, Sachs J adds that section 28 of the 
Constitution originated from international instruments, and thus plays an integral 
role when considering the ‘best interests of the child’ in divorce cases as well. What 
is more is that South Africa also has regional ties and obligations, and the next 
section discusses those ties. 
 
2.3.2 The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) 
2.3.2.1 Background of ACRWC 
The CRC was generally welcomed; however certain shortcomings were identified. 
In her book,62 Kaime highlights loopholes regarding the diverse socio-cultural 
experiences of the regions. The CRC was criticised for carrying Eurocentric values, 
particularly regarding the obvious dependence on the Eurocentric idea of the 
family.63  Thus, it was difficult to rely solely on the CRC for regulation of the 
protection and care of the child in the African context.64  
Consequently, it became an essential part of transformation to introduce an 
instrument that would deal specifically with issues pertaining to children in the 
African context, which Kaime terms ‘culturalisation’.65 This is when the ACRWC 
was adopted in 1990, and came into force in 1999. Additionally, because of their 
vulnerability, children are more likely to be victims of human rights violations than 
adults, and in particular, African children.66 This is because Africa has higher rates 
of poverty, warfare, HIV/AIDS and dangerous cultural practises than all the other 
continents.67  
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These facts alone saw the necessity to introduce an instrument that is more 
appropriate for the African idea of the family. Furthermore, African states did not 
play a prominent role at the time of the conclusion of the CRC. Thus, the birth of the 
ACRWC voiced child protection in the African context.68  
It must however be noted that the CRC and ACRWC do not contradict each 
other. On the contrary, these two instruments complement each other and both 
equally provide the framework where children and their welfare are respected and 
discussed in Africa.69  
Nevertheless, as discussed below, the ACRWC has created better protection 
measures for children.70 South Africa became a signatory on 10 October 1997 and 
ratified it on 7 January 2000. After the CRC, the ACRWC is the second international 
and the first regional binding instrument that acknowledges children as bearers of 
special rights.71 
 
2.3.2.2 The ‘best interests of the child’ principle in terms of the ACRWC  
The ‘best interests’ principle is one of the three main principles of the African 
Children’s Charter.72 Article 4 (1) African Children’s Charter asserts that: 
‘In all actions concerning the child undertaken by any person or authority the best 
interests of the child shall be the primary consideration.’73  
 
Several authors have remarked on the difference in the wording between the two 
instruments; whereas the ACRWC uses the words ‘the primary consideration’ in all 
child-related matters, the CRC states that children are ‘a primary consideration’.74 
Parker makes the following analysis; 
‘I only need to emphasize that whilst [article 3(1)] binds a broader group of 
decision-makers than typically do the stronger formulations, the best interests of the 
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child are only 'a primary' consideration. Clearly “a” is weaker than “the” and, 
arguably, “primary” is weaker than “paramount.75” 76 
 
There is no competition between the two instruments, but it is understandable that 
the African instrument would carry better protection− because, as stated above, there 
are greater dangers involved for children Africa than other parts of the world. 
2.4 Conclusion  
The ‘best interests of the child’ principle has clearly come a long way. Even before 
the CRC and ACRWC, the 1924 and 1959 Declarations had respectively initiated 
and developed conversations about the importance of prioritising and giving 
children special rights. The 1959 Declaration’s discussion particularly pushed for 
the CRC, which is recognised as the turning point in children’s rights. 
Because of its ratifications to the CRC and ACRWC, South Africa 
committed itself to carry the values of both treaties relating to the ‘best interests of 
the child’. Domestic law has done so through the Children’s Act and the 
Constitution. In addition, South African courts are encouraged in section 39(1)(b) of 
the Constitution to consider international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. 
This means that the courts must take the CRC and ACRWC into consideration when 
interpreting section 28 of the Constitution.  
Another important reason for the discussion of the development of the ‘best 
interests’ of the child in international law is to highlight the strong foundation and 
support the principle has from the various instruments. It is a well-respected and rich 
principle that works in favour of serving justice to child protection. 
Furthermore, one of the Children’s Act’s objectives states that the Children’s 
Act was passed in order ‘to give effect to the Republic’s obligations concerning the 
well-being of children in terms of international instruments binding on the 
Republic.’77 Therefore, international instruments have strong ties with section 7 of 
the Children’s Act because the section 7 list embodies the culture of child welfare. 
Thus, the court’s approach of honouring these international obligations would be to 
use the section 7 list, which the SALRC believed would assist in deciding the ‘best 
interests of the child’.  
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Part Two of this paper gives a South African context. This is done in order to 
understand how section 7 of the Children’s Act has considered and developed into 




PART II: THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT 
2.5 South African Constitutional Perspective of the Best Interests Principle 
2.5.1 Introduction 
It is clear from Part One of this chapter that the commitment to the ‘best interests of 
the child’ is valued both regionally and internationally. In response, South Africa 
has included the principle in the Children’s Act78 as well as section 28 of the South 
African Constitution, which will be discussed in greater detail below.  
The ‘best interests’ of the child principle has been an essential part of South 
African common law for a relatively long time.79 However, the law lacked a formal 
definition for the principle, as there were no specific guidelines setting out which 
factors should be considered in order to establish the principle.80It was only after the 
Children’s Act that factors were listed formally in legislation for courts to use as a 
guideline to ensure that the outcomes of  court cases lived up to the obligation of 
treating children with paramount importance.81 
2.5.2 Meaning of the ‘Best Interests’ of the Child Principle 
2.5.2.1 Definition 
B v M82gave a definition for the ‘best interests’ principle, where the court deduced 
the following meaning: 
‘It is appropriate to have regard to the term “best” which introduces a comparative quality. 
The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary includes as definitions, “excelling all others in 
quality”, “most advantageous” and “most appropriate. Two distinctions are drawn: first 
between that which is considered to be consonant with the child’s welfare and that which is 
not; secondly, between those interests which are more advantageous to a child than others 
which are less advantageous. It may, of course, develop that a combination of factors – some 
neutral, some less advantageous, some more advantageous and even some seemingly 
disadvantageous – may together approximate or combine to form a child’s “best interests”.83 
This definition is extensive because it explains what the ‘best interests’ principle is 
and what it does. The definition explains that the principle is a mode of protection 
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For example, in the Van Deijl v Van Deijl89 case, Young J held that the ‘best 
interests of the child’ meant considering the child’s welfare. Considering the welfare 
included the economic, social, moral and religious considerations.90 In French v 
French91, the court outlined four categories of factors that should be evaluated in 
order to determine the child’s best interests. 
First, the court found that the child’s sense of security should be well 
preserved. This meant that the child should feel welcome, wanted and loved.92 
Secondly, the courts should investigate the suitability of the custodian parent. The 
investigation should include examining the character of the parent, as well as the 
religious and linguistic background of the child. In the same light, the courts should 
also look into the general capabilities of the parent to guide the child’s moral, 
cultural and religious development.93  
And, lastly, the courts must consider the child’s upbringing and furthermore 
acknowledge the fact that the preferences of the child were very important.94These 
factors from the French case were used to guide decision-making in a number of 
custody cases.95 Unfortunately, none of those attempted definition of the ‘best 
interests’ principle. 
It was only in 1994 that a comprehensive list was compiled in the famous 
case McCall v McCall.96 This case involved a divorced couple that settled a custody 
consent agreement out of court.  The court made an order of the consent agreement 
and handed the custody of the child to the parent as per the agreement. The non-
custodian parent then approached the court requesting a variation of the consent 
agreement.  
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for the welfare of the child. It has the benefit of sieving what is in the best welfare 
for the child, and what is not. Furthermore, in terms of what the principle does, the 
definition explains that the principle establishes which circumstances are most 
advantageous for the child. Thus, in order to determine what is more advantageous 
and/or less advantageous, the courts would have to turn to the aid of the section 7 
list. A list which was created to serve the ‘best interests of the child’ principle. 
Banach notes that by honouring the best interests of a child, the courts are 
helping with the physical, intellectual and emotional development of a child as the 
child matures into a well-judged adult.84 Therefore, the application of the section 7 
list is both a long-term and short-term solution of ensuring a protected environment 
for children. The courts unwillingness to use the section 7 list endangers the decree 
of facilitating with the development of the child.    
2.5.3 The development of the ‘best interests’ standard in South Africa 
As previously mentioned, the ‘best interests’ of the child had been applied in South 
Africa as early as the late 1800s. However, the 1948 case of Fletcher v Fletcher85 is 
remarkable because the Appellate Division in that case established the principle as 
both a factor to be deliberated in custody cases, as well as a paramount and 
overruling factor.86 
  However, this case failed to set out and explain the meaning of the ‘best 
interests’ of children.87 Rather; it set a judicial precedent for cases that 
followed−where other courts set to deduce their own interpretation of the ‘best 
interests’ principle depending on the circumstances of the case brought before the 
court.88  
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As the party who approached the court, the non-custodian parent had the 
onus to prove that the current custody arrangement was detrimental to the child and 
also prove that the alteration of the agreement would be an advantage to the child.97   
King J then listed a number of factors (hereafter McCall-list) that would be used by 
the court in order to determine what was best for ‘the physical, moral, emotional and 
spiritual welfare of the child.’98  
The reason that the McCall-list was created was that the cases often had poor 
outcomes that left the non-custodian parent doubting their adequacy as a parent in 
the child’s life. Secondly, the courts often failed to unequivocally explain to the non-
custodian parents the reasons for the court’s decision.99 And, lastly, because of a 
lack of understanding on the reasons of the judgment, the parties often felt that the 
courts were unfair.  
It was believed that the reason for the shortfalls of the courts before the 
McCall case was because the courts would focus on one factor to decide the best 
interests of the child, whereas the child’s needs required the investigation of more 
than one factor.100 
By virtue of the above,  for the first time since the acceptance of the ‘best 
interests’ principle, the courts were given listed guidelines on the factors to take into 
account in child-related decisions. These factors included: 
a) ‘the love, affection and other emotional ties which exists between parent and child 
and the parent’s compatibility with the child; 
b) the capabilities, character and temperament of the parent and the impact thereof on 
the child’s needs and desires; 
c) the ability of the parent to communicate with the child and the parent’s insight into, 
understanding of and sensitivity of the child’s feelings; 
d) the capacity and disposition of the parent to give the child the guidance which he 
requires; 
e) the ability of the parent to provide for the basic physical needs of the child, the so-
called ‘creature comforts’, such as food, clothing, housing and the other material 
needs- generally speaking, the provision of economic security; 
f) the ability of the parent to provide for the education well-being and security of the 
child, both religious and secular; 
g) the ability of the parent to provide for the child’s emotion, psychological, cultural 
and environmental development; 
h) the mental and physical health and moral fitness of the parent; 
i) the stability or otherwise of the child’s existing environment, having regard to the 
desirability of maintaining the status quo; 
j) the desirability or otherwise of keeping siblings together; 
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k) the child’s preference, if the Court is satisfied that in the particular circumstances 
the child’s preference should be taken into consideration; 
l) the desirability or otherwise of applying the doctrine of same sex matching; 
m) any other factors which is relevant to the particular case with which the Court is 
concerned.’101 
 
Several judges found the McCall-list to be very appropriate for purposes of deciding 
cases involving children, and thus used the list of factors frequently since the 
McCall case was decided. Furthermore, it was also noted that the factors were not 
laid out in order of importance and many of them overlapped.102  
However, even with the McCall-list in place, Bonthuys argued that the courts 
themselves were confused as to whether the ‘best interests’ of the child could be 
considered a rule, right or principle.103 This confusion led the high courts to use the 
principle in extensively incoherent ways. Other courts went as far as overlooking the 
‘best interests’ as a constitutional principle, but rather focusing on the understanding 
as a common law principle.104 
The confusion and inconsistency of the common law understanding of the 
‘best interests of the child’ principle is what directed the necessity to legislate the 
factors from the McCall-list and ensure that the principle was in line with the 
Constitution and international obligations.105 Therefore, when the courts rely on the 
McCall-list, the decision-makers are leading the legal system back to an era of 
confusion and inconsistency, as well as some factors that are unconstitutional. Thus, 
failing for bring justice for the child.  
Some of the factors in the McCall-list do conform to the ‘best interests’ 
standard, but others do not. For example, it appears that some of the courts used 
gender bias against the fathers of children based on the ‘same sex matching’ in the 
McCall-list. The South African courts previously applied the ‘maternal preference’ 
or ‘tender years’ principle,106 where the mother107 would usually be awarded the 
                                                          
101 McCall v McCall supra (n95) At 205/J-205 G. See Robinson op cit (n90) 74.  Robinson states that 
the list in the McCall-list is very similar the statutory list laid out in s 1(3)(a) of the English Children 
Act 1989.  
102 Robinson op cit (n90) 60. 
103 E Bonthuys ‘The best interests of children in the South African Constitution’ (2006) 20 IJLPF 39. 
104 Ibid. 
105 To be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
106 South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper 103 (Project 110) at 14.4. See also 
Potgieter v Potgieter [2007] 3 All SA 9 (SCA) para 26; Van Pletzen v Van Pletzen supra (n20); Ex 
parte Critchfield [1999] 1 All SA 319 (W). 




care of young children as opposed to the father.108 It seems that it was only in cases 
where the mother was proven to be in too poor a state to care for the children that 
the father would be awarded the care of the children.109 
In contrast, with teenage boys, the courts previously exhibited more 
enthusiasm to award care to the father.110 For example, the McCall case awarded the 
custody of the male child to the father because the court was in favour of the 12-year 
old boy growing up in a male environment that had the father as a role model.111This 
was despite the fact that the father had a history of violence towards the child.  
The case Van der Linde v Van de Linde112 disagreed with the ‘maternal 
preference’ principle and declared that it was a form of prejudice to assume that 
mothers are more suitable to care for the children than fathers. The case held that a 
father possesses the same capacity for ‘mothering’ a child as a mother.113  
Another case that received criticism114 was Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen115 
which held that it was not in the best interests of children to occupy the same house 
as a parent’s same-sex partner.116 This decision was unconstitutional because it 
displayed discrimination based on the sexuality of the parent. This kind of 
discrimination is also problematic because it shifts the focus from the child to the 
parent−an ideology which the ‘best interests’ principle has tried to eliminate.  
All the above cases were concluded before the section 7 list. If the Van 
Rooyen and Mohaud cases had been decided in light of the new legislated factors, 
the courts would not have been as discriminatory. The courts would have honoured 
the ‘best interests’ of the child’ by focusing on the child and ensuring justice for the 
children. Even the McCall case would not have been favourable towards the father 
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because it would have been impossible to award a violent parent care of a child with 
the application of the section 7 list.117 
Therefore, based on the above arguments, it is best for the courts to rather 
focus on a list of factors that holistically conform to the standard, and the section 7 
list does so. The McCall-list clearly falls short in this regard.   
2.5.4 Constitutional Framework 
The significance of rights cannot be overstated. Wasserstrom explains that a society 
without rights would be a society which closely resembles a relationship between a 
master and his slave−the one without power would not be able to make demands and 
this would result in a morally impoverished society.118Likewise, Bandman notes that  
rights are important because they ‘enable us to stand with dignity, if necessary to 
demand what is our due without having to grovel, plead or beg or to express 
gratitude when were are given our due, and to express indignation when what is our 
due is not forthcoming.’119  
In light of this, it is imperative to contextualise the rights of children with the 
same connotation. That is to say that children should not be slaves without power 
that have to ‘grovel, pled or beg’ for the right to protection from possible harm. 
Such an act of ‘slavery’ would impair the child’s right to human dignity120.  
The obligation to acknowledge and respect child protection is secured by the 
Constitution. Section 7(2) of the Constitution states that the state121 has a duty to 
‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil the Bill of Rights.’122 In particular, the special 
rights of the children are laid out in section 28(1) of the Constitution, which, 
together with section 28(2), form the yardstick in protecting children’s rights in 
South Africa. Furthermore, section 28(2) advocates for the paramountcy of the best 
interests of the child in child-related cases. 
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However, section 28(2) of the Constitution merely states that the best 
interests must be of paramount importance. It does not expand on what factors 
should be considered in order to determine the child’s best interests. Reading this 
section alone does not give the courts the guidance the SALRC believed the section 
7 list would give.  
Therefore, another important objective of section 7 of the Children’s Act is 
to assist the courts to decide what the best interests for the child are in light of 
section 28(2) of the Constitution.  Thus, the application of section 28(2) and the 
section 7 list cannot be divorced from each other. The constant reluctance by the 
courts to adhere to the use of the best interests of the principle using the section 7 
list is a clear defiance of the constitutional values of the Constitution.  
As discussed in Chapter Four, there are cases that only mention the best 
interests of the child principle in light of section 28(2), but deviate from section 7 of 
the Children’s Act. This means that the courts are to some extent doing ‘half of the 
job’.123 A ‘full job’ would entail stating the best interests of the child in terms of the 
Constitution, and subsequently apply the section 7 list to ensure that the courts 
adhere to the constitutional obligations.124  
Another section that supports the use of the section 7 list is section 6(2)(a) of 
the Children’s Act. This section states that ‘all proceedings, actions or decisions in a 
matter concerning a child must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the child’s rights 
set out in the Bill of Rights, the best interests of the child standard set out in section 
7 and the rights and principles set out in this Act…’. Therefore, this adds to the 
support of applying section 28(2) of the Constitution– a provision in the Bill of 
Rights− with the section 7 list.  
The question of the ‘paramount importance’ has often caused confusion in its 
interpretation. Below is a discussion of what is meant by section 28(2) of the 
Constitution, as well as how the courts have interpreted this section. 
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2.5.4.1 ‘Paramount importance’ 
The Constitution and the Children’s Act125 both provide that the child’s best 
interests must be ‘paramount in every case concerning the child.’126 As discussed 
below, the word paramount is very strong. However, a useful way in which to 
understand the principle is that, whenever necessary, all the significant interests in a 
given case need to be determined on the available evidence and these must embrace 
the interests of the child.127  
The terminology of section 28(2) may perhaps imply that the child’s best 
interest must be supreme, and the interests of anyone else will not be of great 
concern in the cases.128 Bonthuys disputes this claim by emphasising the fact that the 
‘best interests of the child’ principle should not be treated as a competition between 
the rights of the child and other members of the family.129 Rather, the focus should 
be on the relationship between those rights130 because, in essence, ‘people do not 
understand their family lives as involving clashes of individuals or interests, but 
rather as a working though of relationships.’131 
Bonthuys further analyses the use of the words ‘paramount importance’, 
mentioning the fact that it is different from the wording in the CRC, where the CRC 
used the words ‘primary consideration.’ 
‘This would literally suggest that children’s interests trump all other rights and 
interests and this interpretation has been adopted in some South African cases. 
However, such an interpretation is unpalatable to most commentators, who have 
suggested various reasons why it should not be followed. Some argue that 
‘paramount importance’ does not necessarily mean that the best interests of the 
child is the only consideration. Moreover, such an interpretation would mean that it 
becomes pointless to even consider the rights and interests of other parties, thus 
defeating all rights claims and, with them, the purpose of including the best interests 
principles in human rights instruments and constitutions.’132 
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Therefore, the words ‘paramount importance’ are not immune to limitation, and−just 
like all rights in the Bill of Rights−the best interests of the child may be limited by 
the courts. This is confirmed by section 7(3) of the Constitution, which states that 
‘the rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to limitations contained or referred to in 
section 36, or elsewhere in the Bill.’133 
Many courts have used the limitation clause in cases where two rights have 
come into conflict with one another and they have to determine which right prevails 
in protecting the child from harm.134 The discussion demonstrates how the courts 
have balanced and interpreted the ‘best interests of the child’ principle.   
2.5.5 Constitutional Court’s interpretation of section 28(2) 
As the highest court in South Africa, the Constitutional Court has heard a number of 
cases concerning the ‘best interests’ of the child. These cases have ranged from 
conflicts about adoption135, child abduction136, possession of child pornography137, 
to cases about child offenders.138 Furthermore, in all these cases, the court has given 
their interpretation of what they believe are the best interests of the child and when 
the rights of the child prevail against anyone else’s rights in court cases. 
The following cases were decided before section 7 of the Children’s Act 
commenced. However, they are important to highlight because these cases gave an 
understanding of section 28(2) of the Constitution. And because of the strong ties 
between section 28(2) and the section 7 list, the findings of the Constitutional Court 
are relevant when applying the section 7 list today. 
2.5.5.1 Minister of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick139 
The first case to be discussed is Minister of Welfare and Population Development v 
Fitzpatrick.140 In this case a British couple had been absolutely barred by section 
18(4)(f) of the Child Care Act from adopting a child born of a South African citizen. 
The court amongst other things looked at what would be best for the child if section 
18(4)(f) of the Child Care Act remained unchanged. To do this, the court turned to 
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section 28 of the Constitution. The court thus interpreted the best interests of the 
child in the following manner: 
‘Section 28(1) is not exhaustive of children’s rights. Section 28(2) requires that a 
child’s best interests have paramount importance in every matter concerning the 
child. The plain meaning of the words clearly indicates that the reach of section 
28(2) cannot be limited to the rights enumerated in section 28(1) and section 28(2) 
must be interpreted to extend beyond those provisions. It creates a right that is 
independent of those specified in section 28(1).’141 
 
Essentially, the Court explained that section 28(2) is not limited to the rights listed 
in section 28(1) of the Constitution.142 In contrast, section 28(2) creates an 
independent right and should be interpreted in such an extensive context. 
Accordingly, the court held that provisions of section 18(4)(f) were declared to be 
‘too blunt and all-embracing’143 to the extent that they did not offer any 
opportunities for a child born to a South African citizen be adopted by non-South 
African citizens. 
Consequently, this did not give paramountcy to the best interests of children 
and was therefore inconsistent with the provisions of section 28(2) of the 
Constitution and hence invalid.   
2.5.5.2 De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local 
Division)144 
This next case is important because it proves that the ‘best interests’ of the child are 
not the only rights or interests considered in cases, and therefore do not ‘trump’ all 
other rights. Thus, it is essential to understand that all constitutional rights are 
equally ‘interrelated and interdependent and form a single constitutional value 
system.’145  
This case involved an applicant (De Reuck) who was a film producer and 
charged with the possession and importing of child pornography, which contravened 
section 27(1) of the Films and Publications Act.146De Reuck claimed that the above 
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provision infringed his rights to freedom of expression147 and privacy148, as stated in 
the Constitution.149 Furthermore, he stated that his right to equality150 was infringed 
by the fact that the offence of possession is defined differently from other offences 
relating to distribution and broadcasting under the Act.151 
The court held that persons who are in possession of materials that would be 
deemed child pornography create a ‘reasonable risk’ of harming to children. 
Therefore such individuals forfeit their right to freedom of expression and privacy 
rights in its entirety. As a result of such a forfeiture, this is one of the circumstances 
that justify the act of section 28(2) of the Constitution ‘trumping’ other provisions of 
the Bill of Rights.152 
Langa DCJ disagreed with this finding− he stated that such harshness: 
‘…would be alien to the approach adopted by this Court that constitutional rights 
are mutually interrelated and interdependent and form a single constitutional value 
system. [The Constitutional] Court has held that section 28(2), like the other rights 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights, is subject to limitations that are reasonable and 
justifiable in compliance with section 36.’153 
 
From this case, the focus was on the fact that section 28 (2) cannot be read alone.154 
There needs to be a balancing and limitation of rights in order to decide the best 
interests of the child. To this, the court brought an understanding that the ‘best 
interests’ provision is not absolute, and furthermore, does not ‘trump’ other 
provisions of the Bill of Rights.  
2.5.5.3 S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae)155 
The next case that will be discussed is the case of S v M. Although this case was 
decided after the Children’s Act commenced, it is important to discuss it in this 
section because the Constitutional Court gave an important contribution to the 
understanding of the ‘best interests of the child’ principle.  
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This case involves a mother of three children who was convicted for fraud in 
the Regional Court and sentenced to four years direct imprisonment.156 On appeal, 
the sentence was changed to one of imprisonment for eight months, where she 
would be under correctional supervision as laid out in section 276(1)(i) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act.157  
The main issue before the Court was the duty of the sentencing court in the 
light of section 28(2) of the Constitution. The reason that the best interests of the 
children was considered by the Court was because the imprisonment would mean 
that the three children would be without a caregiver for eight months.158 
Consequently, this would have the potential to be a violation of section 28(2).159  
Therefore, the most significant aspect of this case is that it gave an understanding of 
the fact that the ‘best interests’ of the child principle must be applied in cases of 
criminal activities committed by the caregiver(s) or parents. 
There are several other cases that have given an understanding of the ‘best 
interests’ principle and each cases’ interpretation has contributed to the 
understanding of the principle. 
2.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter, the focus was on the nature and meaning of the ‘best interests’ 
principle and how it has developed in international law and in South Africa. It is a 
principle that has a strong foundation in both international law and South African 
law. This chapter proves that the ‘best interests’ of child principle was created to 
bring justice to the child.  
In international law, the principle was inspired by human rights atrocities 
towards the child. In South Africa, the principle was linked to the need to protect the 
child in custody cases. Although both systems of law developed the principle in 
different contexts, they shared the intension of protecting the child from harm. 
Therefore, as stated earlier, this principle should be seen as a means of bringing 
justice to the child, and not a competition of rights with all the other parties 
involved. 
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With the aid of Bonthuys160 and the Constitution Court judgments161, the 
author has been able to determine what ‘paramount importance’ means in the 
Constitution. The judgments concluded that section 28(2) established independent 
rights. Secondly, that the application of the best interests principle does not mean 
that all the other rights are not considered, and, that the best interests of the child 
need to be considered in criminal cases as well.  
These judgments have given other courts guidance on how they can interpret 
the constitutional obligation to consider the best interests of the child. This is 
important because these findings have to be considered in the application of the 
section 7 list.   
The author also showed how the McCall-list has failed to achieve its 
intentions of creating less confusion for parties in the cases. It has failed to hand 
down judgments that are clear to the parties, and therefore the outcomes have been 
unsatisfactory. And what is more is that the McCall-list contains elements that are 
unconstitutional. The section 7 list, on the other hand, has the ability to eliminate all 
the above problems that have been brought by the McCall-list. And, most 
favourably, the section 7 list is constitutionally compliant.  
In conclusion, as stated previously, if the courts honour the application of the 
best interests of the child, then they are aiding with the growth of the child. It is not 
only a short term solution, but long term. This is the justice to which children are 
entitled.  
The next chapter will look into the common law development and how the 
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3 LEGISLATIVE PERSPECTIVE OF THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
3.1 Introduction 
Children have always been part of society162; however, the attitude towards them has 
not always been what it is today.163 As noted in the First Issue Paper on the Review 
of the Child Care Act164, many children were left in very vulnerable positions due to 
past apartheid policies that did not cater to their needs.165  
Indeed, because of this, it was clear that new laws were required in order to 
include persons who were previously marginalised during the apartheid era. Much 
like the introduction of the ACRWC that was endorsed in order to accommodate the 
African law context and demands, South Africa also required new legislation that 
was in line with the newly introduced democratic laws. 
The above factors gave compelling reasons for the dire need to change the 
previous laws affecting children166 and codify the common law rules in order to 
create more strength in the ‘best interests’ standard. Below is a discussion of how 
the law has changed, looking specifically at the transition from the Child Care Act to 
the Children’s Act and the recommendations that came from the SALRC.  
The discussion of the background of the Child Care Act is important because 
it shows the errors that were in the Child Care Act and how section 7 of the 
Children’s Act has served as a remedy for some of these errors.  
3.2 Background  
The Child Care Act came into effect on 1 February 1987.167 From the very 
beginning, the Child Care Act raised alarm amongst the ‘practitioners, social 
workers and child and youth care workers.’168 The concerns were regarding the 
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operation of, and principles underlying, the legislation.169 Most importantly, the 
Child Care Act failed to create principles that could assist the court in the 
application of its provisions. The Act only made provision for the consideration of 
the ‘best interests of the child’ in adoption-related matters.170  
Furthermore, even with the amendments that were made in the Child Care 
Act post-1994, it was argued that the statutes failed to adequately embrace the 
central principles and values set out in the Constitution and the international 
treaties.171 Thus, South Africa was tasked to create a statute that was based on the 
fundamental principles of both the constitution and the international treaties. 
The concerns about the Child Care Act were noted and a new draft Bill was 
published by the Department of Welfare for comment in June 1995. The draft Bill 
recorded regulations declaring intentions to proceed with urgent provisional reforms 
while awaiting a more inclusive amendment of child care law.172 In September the 
following year, a conference was held by the parliamentary Portfolio Committee on 
Welfare and Population Development (hereafter Portfolio Committee) and the 
Community Law Centre. The agenda of conference was to review and redraft the 
Child Care Act.173  
The agenda also included the review and redrafting of all South African 
statutes that affected childten. The review would also consider and incorporate 
‘common law, the customary law and religious laws’174 affecting children.175 From 
there, the Minister of Justice requested the SALRC to review the Child Care Act.176 
3.3 The South African Law Reform Commission 
The SALRC took on the mandate given by the Minister of Justice and conducted an 
investigation and evaluation of the Child Care Act.177 The recommendations from 
the investigation were submitted to the Minister of Social Development in 1997. 
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Thereafter, in May 1998, an issue paper was published for the general public to give 
their comments and recommendations.178 
During the investigation, the SALRC and the Portfolio Committee preserved 
a close relationship, where the SALRC was updated frequently on the developments 
of the investigation. In December 2001 a Discussion Paper (hereafter 2001 
Discussion Paper) was released for comment, which contained the SALRC’s 
preliminary recommendations and findings.179  
The SALRC then agreed to deliver the draft legislation to the Minister for 
Social Development and the Portfolio Committee at the end of June 2002.180 The 
deadline was met and a draft of the Children’s Bill was submitted to the Minister 
and the Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee.181 In December the same year, the 
SALRC compiled a final report with recommendations as well as the draft 
Children’s Bill.182 
3.3.1 The South African Law Reform Commission’s mandate 
From the outset, the SALRC understood that its mandate involved more than simply 
assessing the Child Care Act. The new law would have to include all statutory183, 
‘common law, the customary law and religious laws’ affecting children. In the light 
of this, the SALRC narrowed down its vision with the hopes of creating one single 
statute that would encompass all rights concerning children.184 
Furthermore, the intention was that this vision would not only be based on 
the constitutional obligations that were laid out in the South African Constitution, 
but also the state’s international commitments (CRC and the ACRWC). Thus, this 
meant that the new laws would be in line with the new South Africa, as well as 
include any omissions that had been made by previous laws.185  
                                                          
178 Ibid. 
179 SALRC Discussion Paper 103 (Project 110) op cit (n106). 
180 South African Law Commission (Project 110) ‘Review Of The Child Care Act Report’ (2002) 2. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid. 
183 SALRC Discussion Paper 103 (Project 110) op cit (n106) 32. The SALRC recommended for the 
repeal and incorporation of these statutes; The Age of Majority Act 57 of 1972; The Children’s Status 
Act 82 of 1987; The Guardianship Act 192 of 1993; Natural Fathers of Children born out of Wedlock 
Act 86 of 1997. However, it the same light, the SALRC recommended that the new Children’s statute 
not to repeal the following; the Divorce Act 70 of 1979; the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996; 
the Maintenance Act 99 of 1998, and the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998. 





The change in law would also affect the ‘best interests’ principle. The 
SALRC would create and incorporate all laws pertaining to the child and align them 
with a constitutionally compliant list.   
3.3.2 Principles underpinning the new Children’s Bill 
As mentioned above, the Child Care Act had many problems. One of the identified 
shortfalls was the fact that the Act did not have a list of principles that could assist 
decision-makers in the application of its provision.186 Therefore, in the December 
2002 report, the SALRC provisionally recommended the inclusion of ‘an objects 
and general principles clause’ in the new Children’s Bill.187   
Some of the guidelines that were included were that decision-makers must 
always ensure that child-related decisions or actions are in the ‘best interests’ of the 
child.188 Secondly, the principle must be applied when determining the facts and 
circumstances which affect the child.  
Furthermore, the best interests of the child should also be applied when 
‘considering the objects, principles and guidelines set out in the proposed Act, the 
Constitution and in any other law relating to the “best interests” of the child.’189 
Additionally, the family of the child should, whenever necessary, be included in any 
resolutions made that will impact the life of the child. Many other principles were 
included which later were included in the final Children’s Act.190 
These principle were created by looking at the context of international 
treaties, South African law (namely the previous law cases, the common law 
precedent), as well as the social practices of the state.191  
3.4 The Children’s Act 
3.4.1 Background 
The Children’s Act is very lengthy and covers a range of different services. The 
length of the document was well anticipated considering the number of years that 
were invested in order to finalise the statute, as well as the different institutions that 
submitted recommendations and comments.  
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Due to its voluminous nature, Parliament made the decision to divide the 
Children’s Act into two parts before it began consulting with the public and 
finalising the new legislation.192The first half was called the Children’s Bill and it 
deals with services that are the responsibility of national government.193 Parliament 
completed the first Bill in December 2005. From there, the Bill was signed by the 
President of South Africa and officially became the Children’s Act 38 of 2005.194 
However, the provisions of the Children’s Act would only come into force on 1 July 
2007.195 
The other half of the Bill was called the Children’s Amendment Bill and it 
focused on services that are provided by provincial governments.196 Parliament 
completed the Amendment Bill in November 2007 and the President signed it the 
following year. It was called the Children’s Amendment Act 41 of 2007.197 The two 
Bills have since been combined into one single statute known as the Children’s Act 
38 of 2005. 
3.4.2 Introduction 
The Children's Act came into full operation in April 2010.198 The section 7 list came 
into operation on 1 July 2007. In its Preamble, it affirms and endorses the rights laid 
out in section 28 of the Constitution.199 The Children’s Act has become one of the 
most important tools of protection for children in the area of the law of persons and 
family law in South Africa, and has also extended to affecting the law of parent and 
child.200   
In addition, the Act advocates for a child to preferably be raised in a family 
environment and in ‘an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding.’201 
Therefore, if the courts are failing to follow the appropriate measures, they are 
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endangering the chances of living up to the expectations of the preamble of the 
Children’s Act. This is specifically true for the cases that do not even care to address 
the section 7 list and merely make reference to section 28 (2) of the Constitution. 
The Children’s Act gives a detailed list of its objects and these include: 
a) ‘to promote the preservation and strengthening of families; 
b) to give effect to the following constitutional rights of children, namely- 
i) family care or parental care or appropriate alternative care when removed from 
the family environment; 
ii) social services; 
iii) protection from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation; and 
iv) that the best interests of a child are of paramount importance in every matter 
concerning the child; 
c) to give effect to the Republic’s obligations concerning the well-being of children in 
terms of international instruments binding on the Republic; 
d) to make provision for structures, services and means for promoting and monitoring 
the sound physical, psychological, intellectual, emotional and social development of 
children; 
e) to strengthen and develop community structures which can assist in providing care 
and protection for children; 
f) to protect children from discrimination, exploitation and any other physical, 
emotional or moral harm or hazards; 
g) to provide care and protection to children who are in need of care and protection; 
h) to recognise the special needs that children with disabilities may have; and 
i) generally, to promote the protection, development and well-being of children.’202 
 
These objects are covered throughout the Children’s Act and they are connected to 
all the provisions in the Act. This means that all 312 sections of the Children’s Act 
were passed with the above objects in mind. Therefore, the section 7 list too was 
passed to preserve and strengthen the family, provide children with their 
constitutional rights, and give effect to the international obligations and all the other 
objects in section 2 of the Children’s Act. 
With regard to constitutional rights, in addition to the right to human dignity 
mentioned in Chapter Two, the section 7 list also plays the significant role of 
protecting and promoting other constitutional rights of children. The section 7 list 
does this by placing the child in an environment that will best serve their 
constitutional rights. Through the application of the section 7 list, the following 
rights are protected: the right to equality203, health care, food and social security204 
and environment. 
With reference to the right to equality, the application of section 7 of the 
Children’s Act ensures that children are treated equally in all the cases. Secondly, 
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the right to health care, food and security is protected by the fact that the section 7 
list includes factors that ensure that the child is placed in the best circumstances for 
their welfare and health care. And, lastly with regard to an environment, the section 
7 list promotes for children to be placed in an environment that is not harmful to 
their health or well-being. 
Thus, the courts’ history of disregarding section 7 of the Children’s Act, a 
provision that promotes and protects the constitutional and international obligations, 
do not uphold the protection of children.  On the contrary, the actions lift this veil of 
protection of children and it risks the development of children. This is an injustice to 
children.   
The next section is a discussion of the ‘best interests’ of the child in terms of 
the Children’s Act. It also looks into whether this list has improved the situation for 
child protection in South Africa since the introduction of the Children’s Act. 
3.4.3 Best interests of child standard 
As mentioned above, prior to the Children’s Act, there were a number of concerns 
and a lack of faith in the application of the factors in the list from the McCall-case.  
Section 9 of the Children’s Act corresponds with section 28(2) of the Constitution 
by stating that the best interests of the child are of paramount importance in all 
child-related matters.  
Section 7 of the Children’s Act takes it further by providing an extensive list 
of factors that are considered relevant in order to determine what the ‘best interests’ 
of the child are. The provision states the following; 
(1) ‘Whenever a provision of this Act requires the best interests of the child standard to 
be applied, the following factors must be taken into consideration where relevant, 
namely- 
(a) the nature of the personal relationship between- 
(i) the child and the parents, or any specific parent; and 
(ii) the child and any other care-giver or person relevant in those circumstances; 
(b) the attitude of the parents, or any specific parent, towards- 
(i) the child; and 
(ii) the exercise of parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child; 
(c) the capacity of the parents, or any specific parent, or of any other care-giver or 
person, to provide for the needs of the child, including emotional and intellectual 
needs; 
(d) the likely effect on the child of any change in the child's circumstances, including 
the likely effect on the child of any separation from- 
(i) both or either of the parents; or 
(ii) any brother or sister or other child, or any other care-giver or person, with 




(e) the practical difficulty and expense of a child having contact with the parents, or 
any specific parent, and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect 
the child's right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with the parents, or 
any specific parent, on a regular basis; 
(f) the need for the child- 
(i) to remain in the care of his or her parent, family and extended family; and 
(ii) to maintain a connection with his or her family, extended family, culture or 
tradition; 
(g) the child's- 
(i) age, maturity and stage of development; 
(ii) gender; 
(iii) background; and 
(iv) any other relevant characteristics of the child; 
(h) the child's physical and emotional security and his or her intellectual, emotional, 
social and cultural development; 
(i) any disability that a child may have; 
(j) any chronic illness from which a child may suffer; 
(k) the need for a child to be brought up within a stable family environment and, where 
this is not possible, in an environment resembling as closely as possible a caring 
family environment; 
(l) the need to protect the child from any physical or psychological harm that may be 
caused by- 
(i) subjecting the child to maltreatment, abuse, neglect, exploitation or degradation 
or exposing the child to violence or exploitation or other harmful behaviour; or 
(ii) exposing the child to maltreatment, abuse, degradation, ill-treatment, violence 
or harmful behaviour towards another person; 
(m)  any family violence involving the child or a family member of the child; and 
(n) which action or decision would avoid or minimise further legal or administrative 
proceedings in relation to the child.’205 
 
Each factor must be taken into consideration where relevant, and the courts are 
given the discretion to determine which factors are relevant depending on the 
circumstances of each case.206 Section 7 of the Children’s Act states that the 
decision-makers ‘must’ take the factors into consideration when deciding the best 
interests in any provisions of the Children’s Act. This means that even when a case 
is centred on parental responsibilities, as per section 18 of the Children’s Act, the 
courts must use the section 7 list to help reach a conclusion on parental 
responsibilities which is in the best interests of the child.  
Unfortunately, the courts are failing to adhere to this requirement. In the 
majority of the cases207 that were investigated in Chapter four, the courts were 
investigating what is in the best interests of the child in light of parental 
responsibilities. However, the courts are continuously failing to adhere to the 
requirement of using the section 7 list to help reach the best solution for the children. 
                                                          
205 Section 7 of the Children’s Act.  
206 Bekink op cit (n134) 191. 




Instead, the courts overlooked section 7 of the Children’s Act in its entirety and 
decided to merely state section 28(2) of the Constitution− which does not provide 
guidelines as to how to determine the best interests of the child.   
A great feature about the ‘best interests’ principle is the fact that it has the 
potential to centre on the needs of the child.208 Maidment explains that a child-
centred approach recognises the child as ‘a substantive bearer of rights’209  in the 
context of divorce proceedings−as opposed to being the ‘object of the different 
parental rights.’210  
Therefore, the child-centred nature of the ‘best interests’ principle involves 
both a focus on the interests of the child and on the rights of the child.211 This is a 
feature the section 7 list promotes through binding courts to use the relevant factors 
to centre the interests of child in divorce cases.   
Although the author does not dispute the list in section 7, this does not mean 
that the list is perfect− however, it is moving in the right direction. Davel affirms 
this by stating that the Children’s Act has taken the ‘best interests’ standard to a new 
level in South Africa, thus, provided the system with more clarity about the factors 
that are significant to establishing the ‘best interests’ of the child.212  
However, Davel criticises the fact that section 7 does not provide an open-
ended list. Whereas, the McCall-list allowed the courts to consider other factors that 
may be relevant to the case213, the Children’s Act does not give courts the discretion 
to consider other factors.214 This provision is rather ‘too strict’ because the decision-
makers are capable, and should be able to consider other factors where relevant.215  
The author certainly agrees with this suggestion. Each family differs from 
the other and the list is looked at on a case-by-case basis Therefore, there might be a 
factor that would be important for the courts to look at and that factor might not be 
in the Children's Act.216 Having a closed list might be to the detriment of the child, 
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and will certainly not be in their best interest. Even so, generally, the list has been 
improved extensively from the previous common law confusion and this will 
discussed below. 
3.5 Difference between the section 7 list and the McCall list  
Before comparing the two lists, it is important to highlight another reason why the 
SALRC felt it was important to legislate the list of the best interests of the child. The 
SALRC analysed that it was evident that following statutory provisions affecting 
children was challenging because of the problems within the Child Care Act.217  
Additionally, at times it had been difficult to establish the legal position because the 
common law and legislation overlapped. Consequently, it was important to establish 
common ground for what was expected of the courts in determining the best 
interests of the child.218  
Also, as mentioned above, the McCall-list was highly influenced by English 
law, and the list of factors needed to be reviewed and legislated in terms of the 
South African constitutional values. Therefore, the SALRC felt that these reasons 
were sufficient to create more clarity into the principle by placing a formal list of 
factors that all courts ought to use in child-related cases.219 
When analysing the statutory list with the one provided in McCall, it is clear 
that the section 7 list adheres to the constitutional values more than the McCall-list. 
For example, some courts previously applied ‘maternal preference’ principle220 or 
desired same-sex matching.221 Evidently, the exclusion of this factor has increased 
the likelihood of the courts focusing on the best interests of the child, as opposed to 
the sex of the parent or caregiver.  
Another example is the McCall case that gave preference to awarding a 
father, with a history of violence, custody of the male child. In that case, the court 
may have reached a different outcome if the case had been decided in terms of the 
section 7 list, which adheres to constitutional values. 
Furthermore, the section 7 list has extended its application to include 
caregivers or other person who play a relevant role in the child’s life. The advantage 
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of this is that it opens the scope for cases where the child may be in the care of 
persons that are not the parents of the child such as grandparents, extended family or 
foster parents.  
As stated in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom,222 the 
state must protect the child, where necessary, with the ‘legal and administrative 
resources’ that will ensure that the child receives the protection that the child is 
entitled to in terms of section 28 of the Constitution. The section 7 list is the 
resource stated in the above case, and it also extends to live up to the international 
obligations of the best interests principle. 
Another difference between the two lists is that the section 7 list does not 
include the factor that there must be an ability of the parent to communicate 
effectively with the child, as was mentioned in the McCall list. However, the 
element of effective communication could be viewed as a prerequisite to being able 
to address a child’s emotional and intellectual needs; a criterion which is mentioned 
in section  7(1)(c) of the Children’s Act.223 And lastly, the child’s preference is not 
mentioned in the section 7 list, but the child’s participation is provided for by 
section 10 of the Children’s Act.224  
As mentioned in previously, not all of the McCall factors conform to the 
human rights standards. The section 7 factors do. Furthermore, there is also a lot of 
other common law precedent which fail to meet the human rights standards. This is 
evident through the inclusion of factors in the McCall-list that were declared 
unconstitutional. The South African legal system must ensure that human rights 
standards are met, and this can be achieved through the application of a legislation 
that has been specifically to designed to ensure this outcome. The courts should not 
continue using old law which was created before the human rights standards were 
developed and which is now not acceptable. The author believes that these actions 
are undermining and dishonouring section 7 of the Children’s Act. 
3.6 Does the section 7 list live up to International standards? 
When a state ratifies a treaty, it binds itself to an obligation to apply national laws 
that are in line with the treaty itself. This is the commitment that South Africa made 
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when it ratified the CRC and ACRWC.225 The South African system bound itself to 
designing legislation that would protect, promote and upheld children. The 
Children’s Act complied with the obligation.   
Indeed, as demonstrated earlier, the national law has gone further than 
international treaties by creating a list of factors that will help the courts decide what 
is in the best interests of the child. In this regard, South Africa’s ‘best interests’ 
principle does live up to international standards, specifically looking at the refined 
list of factors in the Children’s Act. However, the concern is with the application by 
the courts. The next chapter will therefore look into how the courts are using this 
principle in the context of divorce proceedings. 
3.7 Conclusion 
This Chapter has shown how the concept of the best interests of the child has, 
through the years, shifted. Previously, prior to the Children’s Act, the attention in 
the parent-child relationship was solely on the parents and their rights. The law has 
since changed and now the emphasis is on the rights and interests of the child.226  
The SALRC had worked tirelessly with several institutions to ensure that 
decision-makers cannot claim that the ‘best interests’ of the principle is vague and 
indeterminate. The effort involved the difficult task of combining many statutes 
about children into one document, and ensuring that there is clarity on the issues that 
were once declared indeterminate and vague. Furthermore, the process of creating 
section 7 has resulted in a longer and more detailed list than the previous common 
law list from the McCall case.  
Moreover, the author shown that the section 7 list is more favourable to the 
intentions of the SALRC than the McCall-list. By not using this list in the new 
legislation, the courts are ultimately overlooking the core value of what the section 7 
and section 9 are trying to achieve, which is to serve the best interests of the child, 
ensure that the decisions taken are constitutionally-compliant, and to give courts 
clear guidance on which factors they can use to determine the best interests of the 
child.  
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The next chapter will focus on the criticism of how the courts are 
inconsistent in using the list. The chapter will provide further proof of how the 
courts are placing the child in danger by not using the section 7 list. It will look 
specifically at how the inconsistency is detrimental for all parties involved, 
including legal practitioners who prepare cases and cannot predict any outcome for 






4 BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS 
4.1 Introduction 
Divorce brings about great pain to all parties involved, particularly to the children.227 
There are cases where divorce benefits some of the individuals. However, it is stated 
that divorce usually causes a momentary degeneration in a person’s quality of life.228 
It has an impact on the parties as individuals, as well as the unity of the family. With 
regard to the individual, at times it places a person ‘on a downward trajectory from 
which they might never fully recover’ and with the family, it irreversibly weakens 
the family and the parent-child relationship.229  
Fagan and Churchill230, have highlighted some of the emotions and 
consequences of divorce that people experience outside the court. These include a 
decline in religious practice, where the trauma reduces the regularity of devotion to 
God and praying; in education: where a child’s learning ability and educational 
achievements are affected, as well as and health and well-being: where divorce has 
been known to weaken children’s health and lifespan. It also increases behavioural, 
emotional, and psychiatric risks, including even suicide. 
Given the fact the that there is already an overwhelming flood of emotions 
and problems that people handle through the traumatic experience of divorce, the 
process of the court proceedings should not add to the heartache. As previously 
mentioned, the ‘best interests’ principle was created in order to help decision-makers 
reach a decision which is in the best interests of the child all in cases, and this also 
includes divorce cases.  
Boezaart upholds that the law gives clear guidance for children’s rights in 
divorce law and that the ‘golden rule is that the best interests of the children 
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involved in the matter are of paramount importance.’231 Sadly, that is not the 
situation in all cases that come before the court. There is inconsistency with the 
decision-makers in determining the best interests of the child. The inconsistency has 
left many parties distressed and there is a gap between the ‘clear guidance’ and the 
application of the guidance with the courts. Below is a discussion on such cases, but 
first, there will be a discussion on the laws pertaining to divorce and some of the 
procedures that are followed in court.  
4.2 Laws pertaining to divorce law 
The Constitution and the CRC have been very clear about their stance on the parent-
child relationship, both within the marriage and on divorce.232 Section 28(2) of the 
Constitution provides that the ‘best interests of the child must be paramount 
importance’233 and article 9 of the CRC states that State Parties are to safeguard 
children from being separated from their parents against their will, unless they have 
been authorised to do so.234 Therefore, both sources of law advocate for the 
protection of children in the event of divorce.  
In terms of national legislation, the children are protected by the Divorce 
Act.  
Section 6(1) states that ‘a divorce shall not be granted until the court; 
(a) is satisfied that the provisions made or contemplated with regard to the welfare 
of any minor or dependent child of the marriage are satisfactory or are the best 
that can be effected in the circumstances; and 
(b) if an enquiry is instituted by the Family Advocate in terms of s 4(1)(a) or (2)(a) 
of the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act, 1987, has considered the 
report and recommendations referred to in the said section 4 (1).’235 
 
One important factor to note is that the above section pre-dates section 7 of the 
Children’s Act. This means that, prior to the section 7 list; there was no provision 
that mandated the courts to use the ‘best interests of the child’ principle in decisions 
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concerning child custody. Also, the wording in s 6(1)(a) of the Divorce Act is 
exceptionally weak because it merely wants arrangements for the children that are 
satisfactory.236 The material obligation comes from section 28 of the Constitution 
and section 9 of the Children’s Act because these new laws have opened up room 
for the Divorce Act to compel the court to use section 7 of the Children’s Act. 
4.2.1 Divorce procedure 
The South African law has made attempts to provide divorce courts with 
mechanisms that will ensure that the courts obtain reliable information that will help 
the courts in making meaningful and informed decisions.237For example, with the 
intention of assisting the court in complying with its obligation to protect the 
interests of the child, the law established the Office of the Family Advocate in terms 
of the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act.238  
The Office of the Family Advocate consists of legal practitioners and social 
workers, who work collectively to ensure that a holistic and qualitative approach of 
the best interests of the child is followed all through the court proceedings.239 
Prior to the Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act, there were complaints 
about the disappointing manner in which divorces were settled, particularly divorces 
that were unchallenged by the other partner.240 For example, some cases would be 
concluded within three minutes after the court proceedings had commenced, 
whereas the parties invested long periods of time and money for legal and travelling 
costs.241 It became clear that the parties left the court very disappointed and unhappy 
with the court proceedings because they did not fully understand the court’s 
decision.242   
Notably, there was an increasing fear that a great number of the decisions 
were taken concerning the welfare of the child based solely on the testimony of the 
plaintiff.243  The reason for this was because the majority of divorces were 
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undefended or settled cases244, and the courts were therefore not given a full 
overview of the events leading up to the breakdown of the marriage.245 Hence the 
court proceedings were concluded within three minutes.  
The Family Advocate has thus bridged the gap and provided more 
understanding to the parties. Part of the assessment includes investigating the factors 
of the best interests of the child.246 The investigation itself includes reviewing and 
monitoring the settlement agreements and court documents concerning the children 
in order to determine if the arrangement contained in the documents are prima facie 
in the children’s best interests.247  
Thus the recommendations that are made by the Family Advocate in his/her 
report must be considered by the courts before concluding any orders regarding the 
child.248 On the other hand, the courts are not under any obligation to agree with the 
recommendations and should in essence make their own decisions on the welfare of 
children when concluding the case.249  
Because of the strain and emotions of the divorce proceedings, Barratt states 
that it is not in the best interests of children to be exposed to a lengthy and hostile 
dispute between parents on matters concerning care, contact or maintenance.250 As a 
result of this, the Children’s Act guards against the divorce proceedings going on for 
long periods of time. Thus s 6(4) of the Children’s Act therefore states that  
‘In any matter concerning a child− 
a) an approach which is conducive to conciliation and problem-solving should 
be followed and a confrontational approach should be avoided; and 
b) a delay in any action or decision to be taken must be avoided as far as 
possible.’251 
4.3 Divorce Court application of the best interests of the child standard 
First, it is important to note that it is usually in the child's best interests to have an 
ongoing relationship with each parent; post-divorce proceedings and during the 
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separation period.252 However, in cases where the one of the parents has victimised 
the child or the other parent, or cases of alcohol or drug abuse, most professionals 
recommend that such a violent parent should have limited time with the child or 
have access to the child under supervision. In extreme cases, the parent should be 
denied access to the child.253 
4.4 Divorce cases and section 7 of the Children’s Act 
This paper does not seek to dispute the list of factors compiled in section 7 of the 
new legislation; rather, it will have a critical look at how the courts are failing to use 
the section 7 list and their obvious reliance on the old common law list from the 
McCall case. Within the research, the author discovered that some of the courts do 
not use the section 7 list or the McCall list. Such cases merely mention section 28 of 
the Constitution and section 9 of the Children’s Act.254 
The following section explains and proves the inconsistency of the courts in 
establishing the best interests of the child by way of using the section 7 list. The 
author reviewed one hundred percent of divorce cases heard in all South African 
high courts for the past five years (from January 2011 to December 2015). The focus 
was specifically on cases that centred on the allocation of parental responsibilities 
and rights during and after the finalisation of the divorce− which includes issues 
such as care, contact and residence.  
During the five year period, there were 54 cases in which the courts made 
decisions of this kind and applied the best interests of the child standard. The first 
court that was reviewed was the South Gauteng High Court Johannesburg. In the 
past five years, the court had heard 15 cases that dealt with the ‘best interests’ 
principle concerning parental responsibilities and rights.  The court used the section 
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7 list in only four of the cases255, and the other eleven deviated from determining the 
best interests of the child in terms of the Children’s Act.256  
The second court that was reviewed was the North Gauteng High Court in Pretoria. 
This court heard 14 cases concerning the best interests of the child in divorce cases. 
Of the 14, only five cases257 mentioned the section 7 list in order to determine the 
best interests of the child. The other nine cases258 deviated from using the list.  
Furthermore, in all the Eastern Cape cases combined, the court heard thirteen 
cases that concern parental responsibilities and rights. Of all those cases, it was only 
in three259 cases that the section 7 list was used. Then other ten cases did not use the 
section 7 list.260 In the Free State High Court in Bloemfontein, seven cases were 
heard and only two261 used section of the Children’s Act. The others chose to ignore 
the section 7 list.262  
The Northern Cape High Court, Kimberley only heard two cases and neither 
used section 7 list.263 The Kwa-Zulu Natal High heard six cases and only two264 
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used section 7−the others departed from the list.265 In the North-West High Court, 
Mafikeng there were only two relevant cases for this study and neither made 
reference to section 7 list.266 In the Western Cape High Court, Cape Town the court 
heard six cases and only one267 used the section 7 list.268 And in Limpopo, none of 
the cases were relevant for this paper. 
Therefore, based on the investigation that was conducted, only 17 of the 54 
cases used section 7 of the Children’s Act. This is a disappointing 31 percent of the 
cases. The courts are clearly going in a direction that does not preserve the 
expectations of the SALRC when it brought the formal list of factors into the 
Children’s Act.  
It is important to remember that the section list 7 was created in order to aid 
with child protection, and to conclude that only 31 percent of divorce cases have 
used the section 7 list is worrying. The courts are clearly demonstrating carelessness 
in wanting to protect children. They are not considering the fact that they are using 
common law which predates constitutional and international obligations, therefore 
lacking a human-rights-based approach.  
Indeed, there are provisions in common law which are relevant for the best 
interests of the child standard, but the courts do not have the authority to use such 
sources because such sources have been developed and legislated to reflect the 
values of the Constitution.  
4.5 The Contrast in the Cases  
The above statistics have highlighted how the courts are not consistent with the 
provisions they use in establishing the best interests of the child. The next section is 
therefore an outline of how the outcomes of the courts can be affected by the 
inconsistency. 
The first case to be discussed is Caprari v Du Toit269. This case concerns two 
parties who had previous court cases concerning the custody of their daughter. The 
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applicant (father) had a history of violence and as a result, the respondent (mother) 
denied him access and contact with their daughter. However, the father had made 
psychological progress by attending anger management classes.  
The court looked at the case in light of section 7 of the Children’s Act and 
many factors that could impact the outcome of the court. For example, the court 
looked into the needs of the child to be protected from harm in light of the fact that 
the father had received psychological help and would not be a threat to the child.  
Secondly, the court analysed a very important element that the author had 
mentioned earlier in the paper, and that is; the ‘best interests’ of the child must be 
child-centred and not about depriving the other parent of custody of the child as a 
method of punishing the other parent. The court therefore concluded that the act of 
depriving the father from having contact with his daughter was an act of ‘alienation 
parental syndrome’.270The case therefore concluded in allowing the father contact 
with the daughter because this was in the best interests of the child. 
The case of B v B271 may have had a different outcome if the courts had used 
the section 7 list to make a decision pending the outcome of a divorce. This case 
involved an appellant (mother) who approached the court seeking primary care for 
two minor children who were in the care of the respondent (father). The court 
analysed the case by looking solely at the fact that the there was no evidence 
supporting the fact that the appellant was a bad mother. However, the court did not 
investigate the capabilities of the father for being a good parent.  
  There are many factors in the section 7 list that the court could have 
considered in order to ascertain which parent was more capable of protecting the 
welfare of the children, such as the attitude of the parents towards the children, the 
needs of the children to remain with whichever parent, whether it would be in the 
best interests for the children to be separated or both live with the custodian-
parent272 and the nature of the relationship of the father with the children. 
This case is evidence of how the court’s actions of not applying the section 7 
list is reversing the progress of the ‘best interests of the child’ back to the passed 
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inadequacies of the law.  The B v B case clearly used the ‘maternal preference’ 
principle by their willingness to look into how fit the mother is and not the father, 
and if the mother was unfit then the court would have been in favour of the father.  
Many other cases have resorted to merely stating that the matter should be 
assessed based on the best interests of the child, but the courts do not substantiate 
how they reach their conclusions.273 The omission by the courts will result in 
creating further confusion with the parties involved in the cases. 
Ngobeni v Ngobeni274is one of the cases that used the problematic McCall-
list. This case involved a couple who approached the court on a number of issues. 
First, the parties sought for a decree of divorce, secondly, the plaintiff wanted the 
defendant to ‘forfeit benefits arising from the marriage in community of 
property’275; thirdly, the plaintiff wanted custody of the minor children as well as 
maintenance of the children. The other issues had not been mentioned in the case 
because the parties had agreed on a settlement for those issues. 
A Family Advocate was appointed by the court to investigate the case in 
order to determine the issue of care and contact. The court then ordered that the 
children should remain in the care of the mother (defendant) pending the outcome of 
the report of the Family Advocate.   
Msimeki J disregarded the report of the Counselling Psychologist because 
she had not interviewed the Plaintiff, and the Family Advocate shared the same 
concerns as the court with regard to the report. Furthermore, the court also found 
that the Family Advocate’s report was immaterial to the case because it the report 
took into account past circumstances, whereas the court was looking into present 
circumstances  
Rather, the mother’s unchallenged evidence revealed that her new home was 
nearby one of the minor’s school, and the other minor’s crèche was close to her 
workplace. Furthermore, she added in her testimony that it took her less than 10 
minutes to reach the children should there be a crisis. The court went on to assess 
other aspects of the defendant’s life and found no evidence that the child would be 
in danger if they were left in her care. At the same time, the court found that both 
parents were good parents and it was upon the court to determine what is best in the 
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interest of the children by assessing which parent who was better suited to ‘promote 
and ensure the physical, moral, emotional and spiritual welfare of the minor 
children.’276 
The most important aspect of this case came when the courts had to decide 
on the welfare of the child and how the court had decided to assess the welfare. It is 
important to note that this case was heard after the commencement of section 7 of 
the Children’s Act and yet the court neglected to use the list of factors in section 7 in 
order to decide the best interests of the child. Rather, the case made reference to the 
common law interpretation of ‘the best interests’ principle.  
‘I have duly considered the cases of Van Pletzen v Van Pletzen 1998(4) SA 95 (OPD), 
McCall v McCall (supra) and Fletcher v Fletcher 1948(1) SA 130 (A) to which [the 
Plaintiff’s representative] referred me.’277 
 
Remarkably, the Court had made reference to sections 18278, 19279 and 20280 of the 
Children’s Act− all sections that commenced on the same day as sections 7 of the 
Children’s Act.281 Several other cases were also selective in which sections of the 
Children’s Act to apply, with particular reliance on section 9 and section 18 of the 
Act.282 
Therefore, the court had disregarded the Children’s Act provisions for the 
best interests of the child, whereas there courts have been instructed that they ‘must’ 
use the section to decide on matters concerning the child. The court then held that 
the children should remain in the care of the defendant because the plaintiff could 
not prove that the status quo was detrimental to the children.  
Another case that disregarded section 7 of the Children’s Act is Blumenow v 
Blumenow.283 This case concerned an applicant (mother) and respondent (father) 
who had a pending divorce case and approached the court to determine the best 
interests of the child pending the finalisation of the divorce case. The children had 
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been temporarily placed in the care of the father and the mother wanted the children 
placed in her care.  
The father stated that the mother had a history of outbursts, and was 
therefore not a person who could be trusted with the children because of previous 
threats to commit suicide and kill the children as well. The mother denied these 
allegations, and the court went on to attempt to determine the ‘best interests of the 
child’ based on the evidence brought before the court. 
This case is different from the previously discussed case because this case 
mentions section 7 of the Children’s Act, but does not use it to determine the best 
interests of the child.284 Rather, Moshidi, J used the McCall case to decide the case, 
and mentioned all the factors from the McCall list and none from section 7 of the 
Children’s Act. The attitude shown by the court towards section 7 of the Children’s 
Act clearly demonstrates a lack of faith in resolving the dispute between the parties; 
as the Judge found better comfort in common law than in legislation.285 
Another area of divorce law that has become of great concern in deciding the 
best interests of the child is with the relocation of a parent. In such cases, the court is 
left to decide which situation is better suited for the child’s best interest. Relocation 
is in essence when the custodian parent decides to relocate after or during divorce 
proceedings, and the relocation limits or eliminates the rights of the non-custodian 
parent to have contact and access to the child.286  
Unfortunately, there is an omission in this area of relocation because the 
Children’s Act does not make provision for consent procedures for relocation. 
Rather, the courts apply section 18 of the Children’s Act in order to justify the fact 
that a parent who wishes to relocate outside of South Africa should have consent of 
the other parent.287  
In J v J288the court held that it is generally in the best interests of the child to 
remain with the custodian parent, and therefore the child would reside where the 
primary caregiver resides. This is particularly the case if the parent was initially 
awarded the custody. Thus, in spite of the refusal from a co-holder of parental 
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responsibilities and rights, a primary caregiver’s reasonable choice to relocate will 
generally be approved by the court.289  
However, section 31(2) of the Children’s Act, states that before major decisions are 
made concerning the child, the co-holder of parental responsibilities must consider 
the effect the new arrangements will have on the co-holder of responsibilities and 
rights.290 Therefore, in relocation cases, it means the court must consider the rights 
of the co-holder guardian who will be left behind, as well as the impact of the 
relocation to the child. Therefore, when evaluating the child’s best interests, the 
courts must not automatically conclude that the proposed relocation is essentially 
compatible with the welfare of the child.291 
Thus, the courts should be turning to section 7 of the Children’s Act in order 
to determine the best interests of the child. There is however some inconsistency: 
some courts look at section 7 and other courts blatantly ignore the provision. The 
courts that have used the principle include De Groot v De Groot292 and AC v KC293, 
but MK v RK294 chose to rely on past cases in order to determine the best interests of 
the child instead. 
The impact of the inconsistency affects all the parties involved. First, prior to 
approaching the court, the legal representatives of the parties refer to all sources, 
including international law, the Constitution, legislation, common law and case law. 
When looking at case law, the purpose is attempting to ascertain the views of the 
courts so that they can prepare a case for the courts. Therefore, if the cases are 
unpredictable and inconsistent in their interpretation of the interests of the child, it 
becomes almost impossible for the legal representatives to prepare a good case for 
their client.  
                                                          
289 A Skelton ‘Parental responsibilities and rights’ in Boezaart (ed) Child Law in South Africa 88. See 
also HG v CG 2010 (3) SA 352 (ECP) the court refused permission to a mother who wished to 
emigrate with her children. The court held that the relocation would not be in the best interests of the 
children, particularly because it would interfere with their relationship with their father. 
290 This is important because, as was mentioned earlier, children’s rights are not the only rights which 
are considered in child-related cases. 
291 Skelton op cit (n289) 88. 
292 1408/2009 ZAECMHC unreported. See Skelton op cit (n289) 90. Skelton states that the judgment 
focused more in the best interests of the child than the issue of whether the applicant has a coherent 
plan. Paterson v Chinn supra (n264) and E v E supra (n256). 
293 (A389/08) [2008] ZAGPHC 369. The case even complained that the lower court did not deal ‘with 
all the aspects that the legislature regarded as important as contained in section 7’.  
294 17189/08 ZAGPJHC 2009 unreported. See also Central Authority For The Republic of South 
Africa v N supra (n265); Central Authority for the Republic of South Africa v Ashmore supra (n265); 
Central Authority for the Republic of South Africa v MA (11/39798 (2012/1096)) [2012] ZAGPJHC 
45; P P v C P supra (n269) relied on a factor from the McCall case relating to the preference of the 




Evidently, the result of poorly prepared cases will result in the parties being 
robbed of a fair trial because the courts are failing to do their job accordingly. The 
impact of an unfair trial not only affects the parents or caregivers, but the children 
too. The conclusion of an unfair cases might not be what is best for the child 
because the cases are not considering the relevant factors, and the child may not be 
placed in the best conditions for his or her welfare.  
Some authors state that there is not a checklist that could possibly eliminate 
the indeterminate nature of the ‘best interests’ standard. But at the same time 
Ferreira295  acknowledges the fact that the list in section 7 has given clearer 
dimensions for the best interests of the child and it goes a long way in assisting with 
the application of the best interests of the child standard.  
The clear guidelines of the section 7 list make the task of determining the 
best interests of the child much easier. It therefore does not make sense why the 
courts are still relying on common law in determining what is best for children in 
divorce cases. 
Furthermore, various professionals that work in the field of children have different 
views and understandings on the best interests of the child296, and this may cause 
confusion in the application of the standard in court. This is understandable because 
value systems of the decision-makers may also influence the interpretation of the 
standard297 and all the professions have different value systems. This may possibly 
be contributing to the inconsistency in deciding which source of law to use in child-
related cases. 
4.6 Conclusion  
As shown in this chapter, there is clearly an alarming confusion in the divorce court. 
The Chapter started by mentioning the difficulties that are attached to the breakdown 
of a family through divorce. The children and parents experience many emotions of 
heartache and strain and therefore, the court proceedings of divorce should not add 
to the difficulties. That is to say, the courts must apply the correct laws and ensure 
that the court proceedings are not prolonged. 
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 The author has proved that the courts are failing to apply the correct laws to 
bring justice to the children in divorce cases. Through the comparison of the cases 
that have used the section 7 list and those who have not, the author has shown that 
the courts reach decisions that are well balanced when they apply the section 7 list.  
For example, the   Caprari v Du Toit applied the section 7 list by balancing 
all the relevant factors in the case; the mental and physical state of the father, the 
mothers selfishness of depriving the father parental rights, and most importantly, the 
case looked carefully at how the father had improved and to deprive him parental 
rights would not be in the best interests of their daughter.  
The 69 per cent of the cases that did not use the section 7 list failed to 
explain the reasoning of their decisions. As mentioned earlier, the best interests of 
the child is supposed to make the parties understand the reasons for the outcomes of 
the courts, bring justice to the life of the child, promote their constitutional rights 
and ensure that the cases do are not prolonged. And poor outcomes of cases fail to 
do this. The courts need to use the section 7 list and halt from referring back to the 
common law precedent that will not ensure children the justice they are entitled to.   
In the same light, it is also important to note the consequences of the courts 
inconsistency do in essence interfere with the fairness of the cases. The Constitution 
warns against the unfair trials in court proceedings.298 If the parties are repeatedly 
confused with the decisions and do not receive justifiable reasons for the findings, 
then the courts are creating unfair outcomes in the divorce court. Furthermore, an 
unfair trial also impacts the child because then it means that the courts not fully 
committed to protect the child. If the courts proceed with this behaviour, it will 
result in more unfair cases in divorce proceedings.  
                                                          





5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to bring clarity into the development and growth of the 
best interests of the child in light of international law, legislation, common law and 
case law. The purpose of going into detail with the different sources of law was to 
bring focus to the understanding of the importance of protecting the children in all 
matters concerning the child, thereby highlighting how important it is for the courts 
to take note of the significance of this principle. 
The author used the reasons and intentions of the section 7 list throughout 
the paper to prove why the courts need to be turning to the section 7 list as opposed 
to turning to common law. The reasons have been clear from the first chapter of this 
paper. The section 7 list was created because the common law precedent repeatedly 
failed to meet the Constitutional demands.  
The author went further and emphasised the fact the section 7 list promotes 
other constitution such as the child’s human dignity, right to equality, health care, 
food and social security and the right to an environment that will is not harmful for 
their health and wellbeing. These are some of the rights the McCall-list failed to 
uphold because of its unconstitutionality and lack of human rights based factors. 
The McCall-list did play a significant role because some parts of the list do 
conform to the protection of children, however; not all the sections were 
constitutional or promoted the protection of children’s rights as envisaged in the 
international treaties. The author also proved how the application of the McCall-list 
was reversing the hard work that was invested in creating a list that would help the 
courts reach decisions that were in the best interests of the child. 
The intentions of the section 7 list also proved why and how the application 
of the section 7 list was the appropriate method. The intention was to serve the best 
interests of the child. The author proved this by contrasting the different outcomes of 
the cases. This verified that some of the cases would might have had a different and 
more constitutional outcome if the courts had used some of the section 7 factors.   
Apart from the criticism that the best interest is vague, some have also 
declared the standard to be indeterminate.299 This is not necessarily a disadvantage 
because it is the indeterminacy that makes it flexible and adaptable. In the case of 
                                                          




Minister of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick300 the court stated 
that ‘it is necessary that the standard should be flexible as individual circumstances 
will determine which factors secure the best interests of a particular child.’  
Furthermore S v M 301states that ‘the contextual nature and inherent 
flexibility’ of the standard constitute ‘the source of its strength.’ The flexibility and 
adaptability of the principle is what ensures that it never gets outdated. Therefore, 
the very same aspects that make the best interests problematic, have also made it a 
concept trouble-free.302 
Furthermore, section 9 of the Children’s Act also echoed section 28 of the 
Constitution by stating that in all matters concerning the care, protection and well-
being of a child the standard that the child's best interest is of paramount importance. 
The section 7 list connects to these sections by guiding the courts to decisions that 
are in line with the constitutional obligations of child protection.  
The real focus of this paper was proving that the application of these sections 
should be applied in divorce cases as well. Unfortunately, this has not been the case 
in all cases that appear before the court. This has therefore contributed to some 
authors finding section 7 rather disappointing.303  
When the SALRC compiled their report, they did so with the intention of 
creating a statute that would protect children and create a method that would make it 
easier for the courts to follow. As much as the courts analyse parental rights and 
responsibilities in terms of the Children’s Act extensively, the courts cannot ‘pick 
and choose’ which sections to use and which to disregard in the Act itself.  
There is a mandate to serve the best interests of the child and to ensure 
justice to child. The courts need to adhere to this mandate by applying the correct 
legislation that has proved to carry those values of protection. 
  
5.1 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Children’s Act has a few problems in itself. First of all, as identified earlier in 
the paper, the section 7 list is a closed list and it does not allow for other factors to 
be looked at when assessing the best interests of the child. This can be corrected by 
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an amendment of the section 7 list, and this would hopefully discontinue the courts 
reluctance to use section 7 of the Children’s Act. 
Secondly, the Children’s Act should make provision for cases where one of 
the parties decides that they wish to relocate. This is a very complex situation 
because it impacts all the parties involved; the child will have to adjust to being 
away from the other parent, as well as deal with the challenges of moving to a new 
location, the parent that is left behind will not be able to have parent time with the 
child as frequently, especially in cases where the relocation is to another country that 
is far from the place of origin. Therefore, the Children’s Act must attend to this grey 
area of child law 
The next recommendation is with reference to the court and its application of 
the best interests of the child principle in light section 7 of the Children’s Act. From 
the literature and cases that were used in this case, the author did not encounter any 
complaints from the court that could explain why they are adamant in using 
common law as their main reference of law. The courts are demonstrating an 
undermining attitude toward section 7 of the Children’s Act, and all the work that 
has been invested in compiling the list of factors.  
The decision-makers should express their problem with section 7 and state 
what needs to be fixed in order to make it easier for them to depart from using the 
McCall-list of factors to determine the best interests of the child. And in some cases, 
the courts do not use the McCall-list. 
Therefore, there is clearly confusion that needs to be cleared with regard to 
the best interests of the standard principle in South Africa. If this is not done, then 
the courts will continue to dishonour the best interests of the child. And this will 
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